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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Shakira Williams brings this appeal from the District 
Court‘s May 6, 2011 Order revoking her supervised release 
and imposing a 24-month prison sentence.  Williams contends 
that this sentence exceeds the maximum term of 
imprisonment authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583.  Finding no 
error in the District Court‘s sentencing decision, we will 
affirm the Judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 On January 28, 2004, Williams pled guilty to four 
counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) 
and 2, and one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371.  On May 3, 2005, Williams was sentenced to 48 
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months‘ imprisonment, followed by a period of three years of 
supervised release.  Williams completed her original prison 
sentence and began supervised release on May 16, 2007.  
Since then, she has been charged with numerous violations of 
the conditions of her supervised release, including, inter alia: 
failure to report for drug testing; failure to report to her 
probation officer; positive drug tests; leaving a residence 
where she was under house arrest; removing an electronic 
monitoring bracelet; expulsion from a halfway house for 
failing to follow the rules; lying to her probation officer about 
her employment status; and failing to appear for a court 
proceeding. 
 Williams‘ violations led to several modifications and 
revocations of her supervised release.  On December 7, 2007, 
the District Court modified the conditions of her supervised 
release to include four months in a halfway house.  On 
September 24, 2008, following a hearing, the District Court 
revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to five 
months‘ imprisonment and 31 months of supervised release. 
Williams resumed supervised release on December 16, 2008, 
but a month later she was charged with further violations.  On 
February 23, 2009, following a hearing, the District Court 
again modified the conditions of her supervised release to 
include four months of home detention with electronic 
monitoring. 
 Williams‘ probation officer subsequently charged her 
with multiple violations of her supervised release.  On July 
29, 2009, following a hearing on these violations, the District 
Court revoked Williams‘ supervised release and sentenced 
her to 19 months‘ imprisonment and twelve months of 
supervised release, with six of the twelve month supervised 
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release term to be served in a halfway house, and the 
remaining six to be served under home detention. 
 On appeal of that sentence, Williams argued that her 
combined 25-month sentence of incarceration and home 
detention exceeded the 24-month maximum prison term 
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  She argued that any 
term of home detention counts as imprisonment under this 
provision, because § 3583(e)(4) states that a term of home 
detention ―may be imposed only as an alternative to 
incarceration.‖  Since Williams conceded that this issue was 
not preserved, this Court applied the plain error standard of 
review.  United States v. Williams, 387 Fed. Appx. 282, 284 
(3d Cir. 2010).  Due to a circuit split on the meaning of the 
statute—an issue of first impression in this Court—we found 
that the alleged error was not plain, and we therefore declined 
to review the issue.  Id. at 286. 
 On November 15, 2010, Williams was released from 
prison and began confinement in a halfway house.  Several 
weeks later, she was charged with several new violations of 
her supervised release conditions.  Williams argued that, in 
light of the cumulative revocation imprisonment already 
served—27 months and five days, including three months and 
five days of home detention
1—the maximum prison term the 
Court could impose was eight months and 26 days.  In 
response to Williams‘ arguments concerning the effect of 
prior sentences imposed for supervised release violations on 
the amount of prison time that could be imposed for her latest 
                                                          
 
1
 Williams did not complete the full six month home 
detention period, thus explaining why she claimed credit for 
only three months and five days.  
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violations, the District Court concluded that the maximum 
prison term it could impose was not reduced by the aggregate 
length of previously-served revocation imprisonment.  In an 
Order issued on May 6, 2011, the District Court revoked 
Williams‘ supervised release and imposed what it viewed as 
the statutory maximum sentence: 24 months‘ imprisonment, 
with no term of supervised release to follow.  Williams 
appeals this sentence as unlawful, and asks this Court to 
vacate and remand for resentencing. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We exercise plenary 
review over matters of statutory interpretation.  United States 
v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 When interpreting the disputed provisions of a statute, 
we look first to the language of the statute to determine the 
law‘s plain meaning.  United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 
257 (3d Cir. 2000).  ―If the language of the statute expresses 
Congress‘s intent with sufficient precision, the inquiry ends 
there and the statute is enforced according to its terms.‖  Id. 
(citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 
241 (1989)); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (―If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . .‖).  
―Where the statutory language does not express Congress‘ 
intent unequivocally, a court traditionally refers to the 
legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute 
was enacted in an attempt to determine the congressional 
purpose.‖  Gregg, 226 F.3d at 257. 
III. 
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 Williams first contends that her 24-month sentence 
exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under 
18 U.S.C. § 3853, and that the Court misconstrued the statute 
by finding otherwise.  At the crux of this appeal is the 
meaning of § 3583(e)(3), which governs the modification and 
revocation of supervised release following imprisonment.  It 
provides that a court may: 
[R]evoke a term of supervised release, and 
require the defendant to serve in prison all or 
part of the term of supervised release 
authorized by statute for the offense that 
resulted in such term of supervised release 
without credit for time previously served on 
postrelease supervision, if the court . . . finds by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated a condition of supervised 
release, except that a defendant whose term is 
revoked under this paragraph may not be 
required to serve on any such revocation . . . 
more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a 
class C or D felony . . .  
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added).  The maximum 
statutorily-authorized term of supervised release that a court 
can impose on a defendant for ―the offense that resulted in 
such term of supervised release‖ is specified in § 3583(b): 
(b) Authorized terms of supervised release. – 
Except as otherwise provided, the authorized 
terms of supervised release are – 
. . . 
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(2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more 
than three years . . . . 
 Therefore, under subsection (e)(3), the maximum term 
of imprisonment that the District Court could impose in this 
case for a violation of supervised release conditions was the 
lesser of ―the term of supervised release authorized by statute 
for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised 
release,‖ i.e., three years, or the cap for the particular class of 
felony offense set by the concluding clause, i.e., two years.  
Accordingly, the District Court determined that 24 months 
was the maximum prison term that it could impose on 
Williams for each supervised release revocation. 
 Williams contends that in cases like hers, where more 
than one term of post-revocation imprisonment has been 
imposed, ―subsection (b) functions in tandem with a second 
provision, subsection (h).‖  (Appellant Br. at 17-18.)  Section 
3583(h) concerns the term of supervised release that may be 
imposed following a term of post-revocation imprisonment, 
and provides: 
When a term of supervised release is revoked 
and the defendant is required to serve a term of 
imprisonment, the court may include a 
requirement that the defendant be placed on a 
term of supervised release after imprisonment. 
The length of such a term of supervised release 
shall not exceed the term of supervised release 
authorized by statute for the offense that 
resulted in the original term of supervised 
release, less any term of imprisonment that was 
imposed upon revocation of supervised release. 
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Thus, subsection (h) provides that the term of supervised 
release following a term of revocation imprisonment—also 
known as the supervised release ―tail‖—cannot exceed the 
term of supervised release that could be imposed for the 
original offense (in this case, three years), less the aggregate 
length of imprisonment imposed for all prior revocations of 
supervised release.  In other words, the authorized term of a 
supervised release tail progressively diminishes by the length 
of successive terms of post-revocation imprisonment. 
 Williams asserts that the aggregate limit on the 
supervised release tail under subsection (h) interacts with 
subsection (e)(3) to impose a similar limit on post-revocation 
imprisonment.  She reasons that under subsection (e)(3), the 
statutorily ―authorized term of supervised release is also the 
authorized length of post-revocation imprisonment.‖  
(Appellant Br. at 19.)  She further contends that ―[s]ubsection 
(h) is clearly a ‗statute,‘ and thus it—not only subsection (b), as 
held by the district court—must inform the meaning of ‗term of 
supervised release authorized by statute for the offense.‘‖  (Id. 
at 20.)  She concludes that, since the authorized term of 
supervised release is reduced by the amount of prison time a 
defendant served for previous release violations, the maximum 
term of post-revocation imprisonment under subsection (e)(3) 
is likewise progressively reduced. 
 We reject Williams‘ interpretation of § 3583 because, 
as the District Court aptly observed, it rests on a ―selective 
use of statutory language, not the statute itself.‖  (A. 8.)  
Subsection (e)(3) refers to the ―term of supervised release 
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term 
of supervised release.‖  (Emphasis added).  This language 
unambiguously sets the maximum prison sentence by 
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reference to the length of supervised release statutorily 
authorized for the conviction offense, not for the length of 
supervised release authorized after a revocation 
imprisonment.  It is only by ignoring the words emphasized 
above—―for the offense that resulted in such term of 
supervised release‖—that Williams can maintain that 
subsection (h) sets the terms of supervised release for the 
purposes of subsection (e)(3). 
 Indeed, subsections (b) and (h) establish a ―term of 
supervised release‖ for different purposes: subsection (b) 
defines the term of supervised release for the original offense, 
and subsection (h) defines the term of a supervised release 
tail.  Subsection (e)(3) clearly fixes the term of post-
revocation imprisonment according to the former, and gives 
no indication that the aggregate limit of supervised release 
time under subsection (h) applies as well to the term of 
imprisonment that may be imposed when supervised release 
is revoked.  We therefore reject Williams‘ construction as 
contrary to the plain language of the statute, and agree with 
the District Court that subsection (e)(3) is not subject to the 
aggregate limit of subsection (h). 
 We find support for our holding in United States v. 
Hampton, 633 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2011).  In Hampton, the 
Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the phrase ―term of 
supervised release authorized by statute‖ in subsection (e)(3) 
itself imposes an aggregate limit on post-revocation 
imprisonment.  Id. at 338-39.  Although the Hampton Court 
did not directly consider whether subsection (h) imposes an 
aggregate limit on post-revocation imprisonment by defining 
the ―term of supervised release authorized by statute,‖ it did 
conclude that its ―reading of § 3583(e) is harmonious with § 
10 
 
3583(h).‖  Id. at 339.2  In this respect, the Court explained the 
effects of subsection (h) on post-revocation imprisonment: 
Section 3583(h) . . . acts as a cap on the 
aggregate amount of post-revocation supervised 
release a defendant may receive.  This, in turn, 
imposes an indirect limit on the aggregate 
amount of revocation imprisonment.  Once a 
defendant has received as much revocation 
imprisonment as § 3583(b) authorizes for 
supervised release, the defendant is no longer 
eligible for post-revocation supervised release.  
Because the defendant will no longer be eligible 
for supervised release, she cannot be at risk for 
―an endless cycle of consecutive terms of 
imprisonment and supervised release based on a 
single underlying offense.‖ 
Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 329 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 
2003) (per curiam)).  The Hampton Court‘s interpretation of 
the statute—and particularly its view of the relationship 
between these two subsections—is therefore consistent with 
and supports our reading of the statute. 
                                                          
2
 Although Hampton did advance this argument about 
subsection (h) as an alternative to her principal claim under 
subsection (e)(3), the Court did not substantively address it.  
633 F.3d at 342, n.4.  Instead, the Court briefly dismissed the 
argument, observing that ―Hampton provides no support for 
her reading,‖ and concluding: ―it is merely a recapitulation of 
her aggregation argument, which we have addressed at length 
in this opinion.‖  Id. 
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 Williams contends that the principle of statutory 
construction known as the ―anti-superfluousness canon,‖ 
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 n.5 (2009), 
requires that subsection (e)(3) be read together with 
subsection (h) to impose an aggregate limit on revocation 
imprisonment.  Williams asserts that because the limitation on 
revocation imprisonment expressed in the concluding clause 
of subsection (e)(3) is always equal to or less than ―the term 
of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 
resulted in such term of supervised release,‖ subsection (e)(3) 
must be construed by interpreting ―the ‗term of supervised 
release authorized by statute‘ limitation to apply in the 
aggregate.‖  (Appellant‘s Br. at 24.)  Otherwise, she asserts, 
―the ‗term of supervised release authorized by statute‘ 
language never has any effect.‖  (Id. at 25.) 
 This argument ignores the legislative history of 
subsection (e)(3).  The language in question—―to serve in 
prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized 
by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of 
supervised release‖—was added in 1994 to authorize courts 
―to impose a term of revocation imprisonment without being 
limited by the amount of supervised release the original 
sentencing court imposed.‖  Hampton, 633 F.3d at 341 (citing 
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 705 (2000)).  Prior to 
this legislative change, subsection (e)(3) was interpreted to 
preclude a court from imposing a revocation term greater than 
the period of supervised release initially imposed by the 
court.  Id.  Thus, the provision in question is independent of 
the concluding clause of subsection (e)(3), which was 
amended in 2003 to plainly establish ―a per revocation limit 
on revocation imprisonment.‖  Id.  Considered in light of the 
―legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute 
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was enacted,‖ Gregg, 226 F.3d at 257, it is evident that 
Congress did not intend to set an aggregate cap on successive 
revocation imprisonment in subsection (e)(3) when it added 
language that authorized courts to impose a term of 
revocation imprisonment that exceeded the supervised release 
term originally imposed.  Accordingly, Williams‘ reliance 
upon the anti-superfluousness canon is misplaced.  See 
Hampton, 633 F.3d at 341. 
 Finally, maintaining that § 3583 is ambiguous, 
Williams argues that the rule of lenity supports her 
interpretation.  Since we conclude that subsection (e)(3) is 
unambiguous, the rule of lenity is inapplicable in this case.  
See Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 241; Reno v. Koray, 
515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (―The rule of lenity applies only if, 
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we 
can make ‗no more than a guess as to what Congress 
intended.‖) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).3 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                                          
3
 Williams also challenges her sentence on the ground 
that the period of home detention she served must be counted 
towards the aggregate limit on post-revocation imprisonment 
under subsection (h).  This argument is moot in light of our 
finding that subsection (h) does not impose an aggregate limit 
on successive revocation imprisonment. 
